Psychological and philosophical data for a personalistic ontology collected from Augustine's Confessions by Young, Samuel
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Dissertations and Theses (pre-1964)
1933
Psychological and philosophical
data for a personalistic ontology
collected from Augustine's
Confessions
Young, Samuel
Boston University
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/8454
Boston University

Huston Mnttipraitg
(ttolUgp of IGibrral Arta
Satbrary
The Gift of The HukKwtg™^.^
BO
"RM 1933
BOSTON UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL
Thesis
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL DATA FOR A
PER3ONALISTIC ONTOLOGY COLLECTED FROM AUGUSTINE'S
CONFESSIONS
Samuel Yoime"
(A.B., Northwest Nazarehe College - Eastern ITazarene Coll
submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
1933
BOSTON UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF LIBERAL ARiS
< LIBRARY
~f "7 6 if 3
37*. 7++
BO
An 1133 i^r
Psychological and Philosophical Data for a
Personalistic Ontology
Collected from Vagus tine T s C onfcssions
Outline
Introduction: p. 1-7
1. Giving some estimates of the influence of Augustine
upon Christian thought, p. 1-8
2. The proposed task of this paper, p. 2-3
3. The leading sources used. p. 3-4
4. Some qualifying statements regarding Augustine and his
writings,
-p. 4-7
II
..
Augustine 1 s theory of Knowledge., p. 8-24
A. The problem outlined: p. 8-9
1. Dualism of thought and thing, p. 9-12
2. The creative activity of thought, p. 12-15
3. The trustworthiness of reason, p. 15-18
4. The primacy of the practical reason, p. 18-24
III. Metaphysics according to Augustine., p. 25- 57
A. The problem outlined: p. 25-26
1. The nature of reality as concrete and individual, p. 26-29
2. The unity of the world and the world-ground, p. 29-31
3. Reality in terms of volition, p. 31-35
4. The phenomenality of matter, p. 35-38
5. Personality as the key to the ultimately real. p.38-46
6. Building the thought of God. p. 46- 57
IV. Summary of the foregoing* p. 58-64
V. Bibliography, p. 65-67

1INTRODUCTION
1. Giving some estimates of the influence of
Augustine upon Christian thought ,
The limits of this "brief paper cluster around one
ef the brightest stars among the thinkers of antiquity. His
ideas have moving power and every student of the history of
thought has felt their grip, sooner or later, directly or
indirectly.
This outstanding thinker was essentially a religious
genius, so much so that opposing schools of thought alike
claim him as the father of their faith. Schaff declares,
^"All the church fathers are, indeed, the comr.on inheritance
of "both parties," (referring to Catholics and Protestants)
""but no other of them has produced so permanent effects on
"both, and no other stands in so high regard with both as
Augustine." It is this Augustine of the fourth and fifth
centuries (354-430) who now engages our attention and study.
Every church historian of note speaks of him in the
superlative degree, 2 "Calvin quotes him, as he says, Tmore
frequently than any other as the best and most faithful writer
of antiquity T . " Pusey ventures that he was '"perhaps the most
powerful mind of Christian antiquity", lllucken characterizes him
as ^bone of the few personalities from w&om later ages draw
inspiration, and who serve as a lodestar in the solution of
1. Schaff, P. History of the 1hr i s t ian Churc
h
,
Vol. Ill, p, 1016.
2. Insitut .IV, XIV; 26. QuoiecE in History of Christian
Doctrine
,
by George P. Fisher, p. 176,
3. Augustine, A. The Confessions
.
E, B. Pusey, p.xvii.
4.Eucken, Rudolph. TheTroblem 0? Human Life
, p. 248.

3o>f those eternal problems which transcend all ages''. Cleveland
refers to him as 1,T the man to whom nothing of man is alien".
Bertrand declares, ^"The Western soul is marked with the stamp
of his soul 71 . Osmun observes that^ 3 ' T There ± s a silent pressure
of his power felt in every period of the history of the Ghurch
and of Christian doctrine' 1 . Harnack is "bold to call him 4,1 the
first modern man", and declares, 5"He took religion - a trans-
figured and molded monachism, dominated by positive conceptions
and trust in Christ - out of its congregational and ritualistic
form, and set it in the hearts of individuals as a gift and a
task .... But above all and in all, he exhibited to every soul
its glory and its responsibility: G-od and the soul, the soul and
its God".
2. The proposed task of this paper .
In recent years, Khurlson estimates that ^''Augustine
might in a small sense be called the first personalist" , and it
is the pursuit of tbifi thought, presented to us first by Dr.
George C. Cell, (professor of Church History in Boston University
School of Theology) that we present the following survey. Dr.
Cell reminds us that, 7 "In the last analysis, the personalistic
philosophy is the slow, age-long deposit of Christian thought
an<rS-2»Jl on the soil of the Occident." Our proposed task
then is to trace something of Augustine T s contribution to this
philosophy and to show that he had,, for the most part, the
1. Augustine, A. The Soliloquies
. Rose E
, Cleveland, p. xvi
.
2. Bertrand, L. Saint"Xugustine~7 p. 4.
3. Osmun, George W, Augustine
,
the Thinker
, p. 242.
4. Harnack, Adolph .""History of Dogma
.
Quoting from Siebeck,
7ol. V, footnote., p. 2>09.
Ibid
. ,
p. 65.
6.I<hudson, Albert D. The Philosophy of PersonMism
, p. 429.
7, Cell, George C. Seminar on History of American Thought
.
f
3essential germinal thoughts that make for a personalistic
ontology. However , it is only fair to observe here that the
personalis :ic interpretation of Augustine's thought is only one
of a variety that may "be found in him.
3. The leading sources used .
The wri tings of Augustine were so prolific that we
are forced of necessity to limit the source work of this paper,
so we have turned tc the most fruitful field of available data
(at the suggestion of Dr. Cell) i.e., to The Confessions . V/e
h ave followed certain leads given in various foot notes of the
works consulted. V/e have found Harnack T s History of D ogma
,
especially volume five, to he quite rich in suggestive material.
This we have used freely.
Also, in delineating the special earmarks of person-
alism we have followed rather closely the outline in Dean
Knuds on T s Philosophy of lersonalism . This hook we have found
to "be fruitful in suggestive references and ideas regarding
Augustine's contribution to the development of tike personal-
istic mode of thought. V/e have endeavored to measure Augustine
somewhat "by Dean Khudson's outline of personalism in botfe the
field of epistemology and metaphysics.
Cf course no consideration of personalism would "be
adequate unless we dipped into the writings of the first out-
standing personalist, namely, the works of Borden larker Bowne.
This we have done, and have also endeavored to keep Bowne T s
views of personalism throughout as the criterion for the present
inquiry.
•(
4It naturally will "be impossible for us to give credit
to Dr. ©ell for all the references he has pointed out Bad the
ideas suggested in class and seminar. However, we would not
infer that the foregoing is an exact or representative construe
tion of Dr. Cell's insights, nor would we imply that he is in
any way responsible for the conclusions suggested from the ref-
erences given.
4. Some qualifying statements regarding Augustine and
his writings
.
At the outset we would hasten to admit the constant
danger that confronts the reader of the versatile pen of Augus-
tine; that is , that of interpreting him in the light of one's
own thoughts on the sub j ect'discussed. There is so much to be
found in Augustine that it almost literally true that one may
find in him just what he is looking for. Sat where an occas-
ional reader may construct a single truth out of whole cloth
to support his own peculiar system of ideas, the vast majority
will pass by frequent and penetrating insights that have been
engulfed in the mazes of the bishop's meandering rhetoric.
Writing from his own philosophic viewpoint Eucken
observes: l' TTo define Augustine's historical position is by no
means easy. Obviously he forms the intellectual culmination
1. Sue ken, Rudolph. The Problem of -Human Life
,
p. 247.
» 1 - % »
5of early Christianity and dominates the Middle Ages. But later
V
Christianity has constantly drawn from him, and the Reformation
in its main theses appealed to his authority; indeed it is
scarcely a paradox to say that if the present generation means
to tajie up the fundamental problems of religion, and to take
them up independently, it must go back for its historic orient-
ation, not to Schliermacher or Kant, not to Luther or Thomas,
"but to Augustine, as the point where all later developments were
in the formative sta£e, and witere, accordingly, jjheir justifica-
tion or non-justification will "be evident to critical examina-
tion. Moreover, aside from religion, the modern thinker will
find, many poinfs of contact with Augustine, if only he pene-
trates "beneath the often curious expression of the thought to
the essence of the matter." It is our purpose in this paper to
show that "beneath the form of multitudinous theological express-
ions found iimugustine, he was essentially personalistic in
his philosophy. That is, if we view him in the light of his
writings which were written in the epoch of his maturity, namely,
through The Confessi ons , On the Trinity and the like.
Augustine has "been frequently charged v/ith inconsist-
encies. He seems to take positions that for the logical and
systematic thinker are mutually exclusive. It appears to us
that he never carefully harmonized his ideas and Writings, and
it is quite premature to look for any systematic personalism
in his works. This was a much later development. Dean Knud-
som has pointed out that, It is to Borden Bowne that we
Ufriudson, Albert D, The Philosophy of Personalism, p. Of5—86
.
II
6_©we what may be called SYSTEMATIC METHODOLOGICAL PERSONAL ISM.
It was he who first took the personal! stic conception of
reality, grounded it in Kantian epistemology , developed its
implications in a comprehensive Way, and made it the center
and constitutive principle of a complete metaphysical system."
But withal, the essential elements of a personalis tic ontology
are to "be found in Augustine, despite the fact that he fre-
quently did not develop the implications of his own insights.
As Eucken puts it, rsfBi merely followed his ov/n genius, and
in so doing develops an imperishable grc tness
-
Itenack declares that augustine furnished the church
with many conflicting ideas that eventually resulted in violent
controversies. He avers that Augustine 2"G<1VE IT (the church)
IMPULSES AM) PROBLEMS BUT HOT A SOLID CAPITAL". Harnack con-
tinues, 3" It ig one f Reuter's chief merits that he has
proved the impossibility of constructing a system from Augus-
tine's thought, and of removing the inconsistencies that occur
in it."
4Dean Knudson also points out that at times Augus-
tine 1 ^ philosophy is deterministic, precluding a genuine free-
dom for personality. And again, 5that his Absolute idealism
frequently seems to embrace all finite existence refusing to
admit anything "other" to or separate from the Absolute. Thus
Augustine T s piety intermingles with his philosophy and a
serious adjustment is never made.
1. Hueken, Rudolph. The Problem of Human Life
, p. 248.
2« Harnack, Adolph. History of .Jogpia, "Vol, V, p. 98.
3. Ibid., footnote, p. 102.
4. Knudson, Albert D. TBS Philosphy of Personalsam , p. 34.
5. loc. cit.
4
7It is also evident that Augustine never completely
freed himself from the philosophic forms of his da#, and that
some of his tiieology is "polluted "by philosophical Nationali-
zations" current in his times. Dr. Cell observes that -^'Augus-
tine was an empiricist in practice, "but not in theory." Like
others, 2"Augustine does not wholly escape the faults of his
age - he was part of it." We are left then, 3" to press for-
ward to the living whole of Augustine T s personality in order
to find a "bond of union underlying the manifold elements, and
rendering their contradictions intelligible." But withal let
ug remember that 4"this personality cannot be brought within
the limits of formal logic". In many respects Augustine T s
peculiarities are his strength and sometimes his inconsis-
tencies are also shrieking testimonies to the wealth and con-
tent of his thought. Eucken concludes, °" Yet, however much
we may find to criticise, if we follow Augustine ' s self-rev-
elations to their source, they always disclose a genuine human
and wholly intelligible aspiration; they reveal a man of in-
tegrity, a powerful man, and one to whom nothing Ifcar&m is
foreign.
"
1. Cell, george 0. Seminar on Augustine .
2. Augustine
,
A. The Confessions of Augustine
.
W. T. G. Shedd,
p.xxxii
.
3. Sueken, Rudolph. The Problem of Human Life
, p. 21*,
4. loc . cit
.
5. Ibid.
, p. 215.

8£. AUGUSTINE 1 S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
• A. The Problem Outlined ,
D'ean Knudson has pointed out the four essential
elements xo personalism T s epistemology in his Philosophy of
Personalism . These are: (l) the dualism of thought and thing,
or idea and object; (2) the creative activity of thought;
(3) the trustworthiness of reason; and (4) the primacy of
the practical reason. For the sake of convenience we have
adopted this formula in studying Augustine T s theory of know-
ledge
.
Dean Khu&son also reminds us that 1ttAugustine fails
to distinguish truth as a general concept and truth as object-
ively real. For him T to "be true is the same as to "be T . The
idea of Truth implies its reality." \nd yet, the way to reality
had a vital hold on Augustine's thought as manifested in his
writings. In the opening chapter of The Confessions he prays,
^"Grant me Lord, to know and understand which is first, to call
on Thee or to praise Thee? and, again, to know Thee or to call
on Thee? F or v/ho con call on Thee, not knowing Thee? For he
that knoweth Thee not, may call on Thee as other than Thou art.
Or, is it rather, that we call on Thee that we may know Thee?"
Again read him as he exclaims, ^"Perish every thing, dismiss
we these empty vanities, and "betake ourselves to the one search
l.Knudson, Albert "D. The Philosophy of Personalism
, p. 266.
S.Augustine, A. The TTonfcs sions
. E
.
B. Pusey. I. 1.
3. Ibid., V, 11.
t
9for truth!" It seems incredible thaft one so eager to find the
ultimately real could ignore -^he pathways that led to that in-
ward satisfaction. However, it is well to note here that epis-
temology for Augustine has only relative importance, namely, as
it leads to metaphysics. His Iphilosophy then is predominantly
metaphysical. In this reppect too, he is genuinely Iperson-
alis tic in his emphasis. Augustine was not one that was guilty
of spending all of his time in sharpeneingjhis axe - he had. wood.
j?o cftop. It seems to us that Augustine was so keenly aware of
the parallelism existing between truth and reality, and their
mutual interests, that at times he appears to identify epistem-
ology and metaphysics. This parallelism itself is readily
accepted by the leaders of personalistic thought, but of course
without the Augustinian identity.
1. Dualism of thought and thing .
Personalism is essentially dualistic in its epistem-
ology. But, as Dean Krraftson puts it, 2n It is not the disparity
between the experienced object and the real object that makes an
ep^istemology dualistic, but their mutual otherness."
Augustine suggests this "otherness" in the words,
"They wish then to hear me confess what I am within; whither
neither thefcr eye, nor ear, nor understanding, cajq reach; they
wish it, as ready to believe - but will they know?" The impen-
etrable depths of reality implied in that subtle turn of thought
to a cues ti on mark, seems to point to the unique "otherness"
1. Khudson, . D. The Ihilosophy of I ersonalism
, p. 168.
2. Ibid. , p. 103.
3. Augustine, A. The Confessions
,
E.B.Pusey, X, 3.
t1
10
between idea and. object. In the same vein he writes, 1,TBut
their ear is not at my heart, where I am, .whatever I am". That
"whatever I am" suggests an underlying agreement with JLotze T s
description of reality as a precipitate whoSe genesis we can
never grasp. Similarly, Dean Knudson observes: ^"What reality
is, the human mind, do&s not predetermine. It is something re-
vealed, to us through sensations and perseptions. We do not
make it, we find, it .... Reality is thus something other than
our thought of it. Indeed, it is something deeper and richer
jrhan all thought..,. The world is not mere idea; it is idea
translated into deed. How this translation takes place we do
not know."
In his psychological analysis of memory Augustine
delineates "between idea and object. 4,1 1 name a bodily pain,
yet it is not present with me, when nothing aches: yet unless
its image were present to my memory, I should not know what to
say thereof, nor in discoursing discern pain from pleasure."
It is this ability to discern or distinguish through differ-
ences that gives him an intelligent view of the world about him.
In the language of Bowne, ^"Q^eots only "become objects as they
are differenced from one another."
Again Augustine writes: ^"All these (referring to
light, sounds, smells, etc.) doth the great harbor of the mem-
ory receive in her numberless secret and inexpressible wind-
ings, to be forthcoming and brought out at need; each entering
1. Augustine, A. The Confessions
.
E. B
.
Pusey. X, 3.
2. Quoted by Knudson, Albert D. The [ - juhy of Personalis
p. 106.
3. Knudson, Albert D. The Philosophy of Personalism
, p. 106
4. Augustine, A. The Confossiors
,
E. B
,
Pusey. 15.
5.Bowne, Borden P. Ulriei T s Logic. The New Englander, XXXIII
(1874), p. 465. 2
6. Augustine, A. The Confessions
. E. B. Pusey. X, 8.
t
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in "by his own gate , and there laid up. r|S[or yet do the things
themselves enter -in ; only the images of the things perceived
are there in readiness, for thought to recall,"
Likewise, 2 "The self as known stands opposed to the
self as knov/er.... The idea "by which the self apprehends itself
is not identical with the self. The idea of the self is itself
a thought product." This seems to "be the drive of Augustine
when he queries, 3 "For whence does a mind know another mind,
if it does not know itself?.... As the mind, then, itself
gathers the knowledge of corporeal things through the senses
of the "body, so of incorporeal things through itself. There-
fore it knows itself also through itself, since it is incorp-
if
oreal; forAt does not know itself, it does not love itself."
And again: 4"F r even w hile- I dwell in darkness
and silence in my memory I can produce colors, if I will, and
discern, betoveen black and white, and what others I will! nor
yet do sounds break in, end disturb the image drawn in by my
eyes, which I am reviewing, though they also are there, lying
dormant and laid up, as it were, apart .... These things do
I within, in that vast court of my memory; For there are pre-
sent with me, heaven, earth, saa, and whatever I could think
on therein, besides what I have forgotten." Thus Augustine
wou2_d emphasize the distinction between subject and object by
differentiating between the mind itself and its feelings,
1. .Underscoring is mine. S. Y.
2. Khudson, Albert D. The Philosophy of Personal! sm
, p. 111.
3. Schaff , P. ITieene and Post-Mccne Fathers
,
Vol. "III. On
the Trinity, IX, 3.
4Augas.tine, A. The Confessions
. E, B. Pusey. X, 8.
•
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thoughts and activities. He would seem to say in agreement
with personal!sm^ne self is deeper than any one or all of its
activities
.
In seeking for the ultimately real Augustine never
identifies God with his own thought. There is a gulf fixed
that only faith can leap. This is the attitude of his soul
when he declares, 1,TAnd t&us with the flash of one trembling
glance it arrived at THAT WHICH IS." It was this "flash" that
maIe
Sfie translation , heretofore impracticable to lumbering
thought
.
2, The creative activity of thought .
The question as to how experience is male possible is
held "by 2Bj)\me to he one of epochal significance. Then he
adds, 3"Kant T s answer is well 3mown*, Experience is not some-
thing given ready-made from without, hut is actively constructed
"by the mind within. Experience is possible only through a cer-
tain constitutive mental activity, according to the principles
immanent in the understanding. In this way the raw materials
of sense impressions, which in themselves are fleeting and dis-
continuous, 16 built into a rational world of experience." l^
eii
Bowne concludes with emphasis, 4 "This insight was Kant's great
contribution to philosophy, and it remains, in spite of all
criticism, a permanent possession of reflective thought.
1. Augustine, A. The Confessions , E. B. Pusey. X, 8.
2
.
Bowne, Borden P. PersonalismT p. 56.
3. loc. cit.
4. loc. cit.

-i This Kantian idea of the creative activity of thought
is a vital part of Bowne T s epistemology . The same idea (though
but in germ) is to "be found in Augustine T s philosophy. Here,
however, as in other instances, the thought is left in "a
state of arrested development", and its logical implications
are largely overlooked.
Referring to the unifying and self-directing agency
of the mind in a psychological analysis" of memory, Augustine
writes: -'-"There also I meet with myself, and when, where, and
what I have done, and under what feelings .... Out of the same
store do I myself with thejpast continually combine fresh and
fresh likenesses of things which I have experienced, have
"believed." Thus sensations, images and perceptions are con-
structed for the mind itself and as such are the products of
thought actvity. Another citation: "For who would willingly
speak thereof, if so oft as we name grief or fear, we should he
compelled to he sad or fearful? And yet could we not speak
of them
,
did we not find in our memory, not only the sounds
of the names according to the images impressed "by the senses
of the "body, "but notions of the very thing themselves which
we never received "by any avenue of the body, hut which the
mind itself perceiving "by the experience of its own passions,
committed to the memory."
The mind is certainly not the passive recinient
A
1. A ugustine, A. The Confessions
.
S. B, Pusey, X, 8.
2. Ibid.
,
X, 14.
•
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of external stimuli, aeeor&ing to Augsutine: it is an active
agent that makes its mm pictures. 1,TFor even while I dwell
in darkness and silence in my memory I can produce colors,
if I will, and discern "between "black and white, and what
others I will: nor yet do sounds "break in, and disturb the
image drawn in noy my eyes, which I am reviewing, though they
also are there, lying dormant, and laid up, as it were
,
apart
,
n
Augustine also tries to account for error through
the creative activity o^ thought. Tie writes: ^"But hecause
the mind has great power to imagine not only things forgotten,
"but also things that it never saw, or experienced, either "by
increasing, or diminishing or changing or compounding, after
its pleasure , those which have not dropped out of its remem-
brance, it ©iten imagines things to "be such as either it knows
they are not, or does not know that they are."
We- readily admit that oigastine does not show clearly
that sensations themselves are thought-products , out he does
suggest something of their inarticulate state without the
active mind. ,:,:TAs the mind, then, itself gathers the know-
ledge of corporeal things through the senses of the "body, so
of incorporeal things through itself."
llamory is ""or Augustine the wealthy and expansive
storehouse of the mind whose doors open and close largely at
the "behest o'f the will. ^ ,T When T enter there, I require what
1. - A^jugustine , A. The Confessions . E. B. Pusey X, 8.
2. Schaff , P. ITicene and Post-Iiicene Fathers
,
Vol. III.
On the Trinity, XI, 5.
.?>. Ihid.
,
IX, 3.
4. A^jugustine , A. loc, cit.
•
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jl will, to "be "brought forth, and something instantly comes;
others must "be longer sought after, which are fetched, as it
v/ere , out of some inner receptacle; others rush out in troops,
and while one thing is desired and required, they start forth,
as who shouIS. say, T Is it perchance I? T These I drive away
with the hand of my heart, from the face of my remembrance;
until •/•hat I wished for "be unveiled, and appear in sight, out
of its secret place." Consciousness thus "becomes for Augus-
tine a living stream dominated "by the unifying active mind at
the control of the will,
0t. The trustworthiness of reason
.
Personalism has a high degree of confidence in the
self-sufficiency of reason, "but at the same time it avoids the
and skepticism- . . , .
egotism or rationalism^ Bowne repeatedly pointed out that
there was no conclusion other than solipsism for the confirmed
skeptic
.
A ugustine gives us a glimpse of his own emancipa-
tion from skepticism when he writes concerning his first
great work, C ontra Academic os ; -"vVhatever "be the value of
those treatises what I most rejoice in is, not that I have
vanquished the Academicans, as you express it (usimg the lan-
guage rather of friendly partiality than of truth) , hut that
I have "broken and cast away from me the odious "bonds "by whiBh
I was kept hack from the nourishing brealfifi of philosophy,
1. Augustine, A. Letters I, 3. Quoted in The Soliloquies
.
Rose E
.
Cleveland, footnote 24, p. 132.
1
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through despair of attaining that truth which is the food of
the soul." Bowne also declares : 1,TWhatever mystery attaches
to the process of knowledge and whatever verbal douhts majr hg
raised ahout it, the knowledge vindicates itself within its
own sphere "by the clearness of our apprehension and hy its
consistency in experience." In the same mood Augustine
writes: 2lTAs regards the uncertainty ahout everything which
Varro alleges to he the differentiating characteristic of the
New Academy, the City of God thoroughly detests such doubts as
madness. Regarding matters which it apprehends "by the mind
and reason it has most absolute certainty although its know-
ledge is limited.... It "believes also the evidence of the
senses which the mind uses by aid of the hody; for (if one
who trusts his senses is sometimes deceived) , he is more
wretchedly deceived who fancies he should never trust them,"
There is thus a validity"' ^"bout personal knowledge that is
trustworthy for Augustine.
But the natural limits of the human mind are not
ignored "by this thorough-going philosopher. He writes, °"For
fairer is the modesty of a candid mind than the knowledge of
those things which I desired." Similarly, 4"And that mind
is more praiseworthy which knows even its own weakness, than
that which, without regard to thici, the ways of the stars, or
which holds fast such knowledge already acquired, while ignorant
1. Bowne, B. P. Personalism , p. 80 .
2. Schaff , P. ITicene and \ ost-Hicene Fathers , Vol, II, The
City of God, XII,
-
!^
3, A_n.rastine , The Confessions . E.B.Pusey, ¥, 7,
4, Scfr&ff
,
P, Nicene and Post -ITicene Fathers
,
Vol. Ill,
On the Trinity, IV, 1.
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pf the way "by which itself to enter into its own proper
health and strength." Such quotations as these seem to us to
put out Augustine forever from the school of extreme ration-
alists in which he is so often placed.
Dean Khudson points put1 that while it is true that
we must as rational "beings assume the validity of reason,
he reminds us that this assumption is itself a matter of
faith, and that to accept reason, quite as much as to reject
it is at "bottom an act of volition. There seems to be a
similar inference made in Augustine's remarkable quotation:
2
"And consequently, neither am I deceived in knowing that I
know. For, as I know that I am, so I kncr ;this also, that I
know." Reason and reality are both inwardly certain but with-
out any logical rationalization.
Schaff also observes concerning Augustine T s thought
that,' "He alv/ays aaseated, indeed, the primacy of faith,
according to his maxim: FIDES PRAECEDIT INTELLECTUM; appeal-
ing, with theologians before him, to the well-known passage
of Isaiah 7:9 (in the LXX): TUISI CREDIDERITIS , NOW DTTELLHI*
GET IS 1
.
But to him faith itself was an acting of reason,
and from faith to knowledge, therefore, there was a necess-
ary transition."
As we have already pointed out (p. cj) y Augustine
makes much of the parallelism "between truth and reality, so
that to accuse him of questioning the fundamental validity of
1. Khudson, :\lhert D. The Philosophy of Personal! am
. p. 143.
2 .Schaff
,
P
.
ITicenp and Post^Hifrenc^FaThers
.
Vol. Tl
,
* The
City Go(l> XI ,"56;
3. Ibid., Vol. I, Prolegomena, p. 11
-J
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reason would "be equivalent to assuming his skepticism con-
cerning reality itself; for he writes, - ln that seems to me
to "be true which is." And again, "411 things are true so fay
as they "be; nor is there any falsehood, unless when that is
thought to "be which is not."
-• primacy of the practical reason .
Without a doubt personalism is voluntaristic rather
than rationalistic. s"It lays more stress on the will than the
imtellec^and inclines to the view that life is deeper than
logie." This was Bowne T s position constantly. We find him
referring to ^"the fanatical logician" and voicing a certain
distrust for those who would measure all truth "by the canon of
consistency alone. H_ e avers: 4"Han is life rather than
reason, and reason only strives to formulate what life and
reality are," Again he writes: '"If a man were not will, as
well as understanding, his system of "belief would "be differ-
ent." So he concludes, 6 " It is the will rather than the under-
standing which declares the case closed."
Augustine seems to recognize this cognitive function
of the will when he writes: 7"Teach me, Thou, how to come to
Thee! I have nothing other than the will! It know nothing other
than that the fleeting and the falling should he spurned, the
fixed and eternal sought after."
' * * a• * * C •* >*»- « y » - ' . L * #
1. Augustine, A. The Soliloquies, .""lose E
. Cleveland, p. 65.
2. TChu&son, A. D. The Philosophy of Personalism
. p. 67.
3. Bowne, B. P. Studies in Theism
, p. 64.
4. Ibid., p. 74.
5. Bowne, B. P.
'
Theory of Thought and Knowledge
, p. 380.
6. loc
.
cit,
7. Augustine, 4. op. cit. p. 8.

19
In the above quotation the idea of value or
worth is also introduced. Certain ideas should "be spurned
as worthless ("the fleeting and the falling should "be
spurned" ) , that the valuable and ideal may he realized,
("the fixed and eternal sought after" 0-
In his arguments with the Maniehaeans Augustine
points out clearly how emotion and will enter into the
thinking and conclusions of even Tils' rationalistic oppon-
ents. This he does "by citing his own. experience in the
Maniohaean Ord£r. 1tt Thence it resulted that whatever they
said, as if affeete&fi'by certain strange disorders, I ap-
not^ because IJcmw it to he true,, " '
, ,proved o.1 " trVL@ t JaWz because x wish@&. it to be. So it
came about that, however slowly and cautiously, yet for a
long time I followed men that preferred a sleek ( shining)
straw to a living soul."
In his emancipation from I-anachaeistic philoso-
phy Augsatine again points out the place of will and emo-
tion in reaching a spiritual view of reality. ^"Being led,
however, from this to prefer the Catholic doctrine, I felt
that her proceeding was more unassuming and honest, in that
she required to be belfved things not demonstrated? ....
whereas among the Hani one es our credulity was Blocked by a
promise of certain knowledge, and then so many most fab-
ulous and -absurd things were imposed to be believed, because
1. ocahff , P. \ icene and Post-ITicene Fathers
,
Vol, IV,
Against the Ivlanichaaans
,
IX.
E.AugHHtine
,
A. The Confessions
. E . B
.
Pusey, VI, 5.
r
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they could not "be demonstrated.
t
In the same vein/concerning the same struggle for
reality, he writes, 1,1 And I did in my inmost soul "believe that
Thou were incorruptible, and taxinsurable , and unchangeable;
"because though not knowing whence or how, yet I saw plainly
and was sure, that that which may "be corrupted, must he infer-
ior to that which cannot; what coulS^e injured I preferred
unhesitatingly to what could receive injury; the unchangeable
to things subject to change." In this quotation the express-
ions, "must be inferior" and " I preferred unhesitatingly", are
again indicative qf the place of ^value judgments in Augustine T s
epistemology
.
ILe uses the same approach to reality in the
FT
following: ° TTBut since most truly and certainly, the incor-
ruptible is preferrable to the corruptible, (as I did now prefer
it,) tjien, wert Thou not incorruptible, I could in the thought
have arrived at something better than my G-od, When then I saw
the incorruptible to be preferable to the corruptible, there
otight I to seek for Thee, and there observe wherein evil itself
was I" The validity of will and emotion for cognitive purposes
is thus affirmed fairly definitely. Siebeck observes in study-
ing Augustine in this regard: 4 "Even the powers of the intellect
are looked at from a new point of view, owing to the influ-
ence exerted on them by the heart and will, and they lose,
in consequence, their claim to sole supremacy in scientific
1. .Augustine , A. The Confessions . E.B.Pusey, VII, 1,
2. The place of value judgments is so vital to Augustine T s
thought of God that we have given it further consideration on
page
3. Aligns tine , A. " - op. cit.
,
VII, 4,
4. Siebeck, Quoted by Harnack, Adolph. History of Dogma t V,
p. 107-8.
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thought." And thus the supreme decision does not rest ulti-
mately on reason "but on ltT the irresistible force of the in-
ternal."
Tjruth to Augustine is something that has an inward
certainty. He asks, 2"Will you affirm that to "be false which
with a strong voice Truth tills me in my inner ear, concerning
the Eternity of the Creator, that His substance is in no ways
change^ "by time, nor His will separate from His substance?"
Frequently Augustine speaks of his '^" inner ear" as descriptive
of an intuitive certainty of the soul. TJ^is thought is not
far removed from the language of Bowne written to Frofessor
Cell: ^"Any knowledge of reality must finally rest on some
important intuition of which no further account can he given."
Reality is thus ultimately "based on personal experience. Com-
pare this with the following experience related in Augustine T s
autobiography: ""And thus with the flash of one trembling
glance it arrived at That Which Is and then I saw Thy invis-
ible things understood by the things which are made."
Bowne also declares th^t, 6,1 The great fundamental, •
and abiding feelings of the race prove much". He believed
that our total subjective, abiding feelings were reliable
index fingerse vhen^the ensuing results were basic and perma-
\
nent. Augustine makes a similar appeal to race experience
when he declares, 7 "It is no vain and empty thing, that the
1. Siebeck, Quoted by Harnack, A. History of Dogma
,
V, p. 107-8.
2. Augustine, A. The Confessions, 2 . 13 . Pusey, XI, 15.
3. loc. cit.
4. Cell, George C. Lectures on His bory of American Thought
,
class room notes. „ ' ITZ" ,„
5. Augustine , A. The- Confess-ions , F.B. Pusey, VII, 17.
6. Bowne, B . P. Studies in Theism , p. 65*.
7. Augustine, A. op, cit. VI | 11. .
f» *
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excellent dignity of the authority of the Christian Faith
hath overspread to the whole world." Here Augustine would say
that the Christian ideal is universally practicable "because of
its present general acceptance, and these practical results
are arguments in favor of its validity.
In Augustine T s personal struggle for spiritual eman-
cipation he points out that his "bondage lay not ! in the under-
standing, "but in the will. Having learned of the open confes-
sion of faith on the part of his renowned friend, Victorinus,
Augustine admits that he -'-"was on fire to imitate him"; "but
lacked the will. ""My will the enemy held, amd thence had
made a chain for me, and hound me." He seems to sense the
fact that he held the key in his own hands for his release
when he cries out to his friend Oypius
,
3
"What ails us? what
is it? What heardest thou?. The unlearned start up and take
heaven by force, and we with our learning, and without heart,
lo, where we wallow in flesh and bloodl Are we afchamed to fol-
low, "because others are gone "before, and not ashamed not even
to follow?" The "heart" that they lacked was the will to
"believe and the will to abandon their evil habits.
Faith is a practical necessity to all knowledge
according to personalism. ^"Knowledge , before it can become a
rounded system, must call mn the category of purpose, a prin-
ciple borrowed from the practical reason; and so also at its
1. Augustine, A.. The Confessions . I. B, Ptisey, VIII, 5.
2 . loc . cit
,
3. Ibid. , VIII
( q #
4. Khu&son, A
.
' P
.
* The Philosophy of Personalism
,
pi 162.
r
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very inception, in its most elementary forms, it requires a$
its presupposition an act of faith, which likewise is rooted
in the practical reason." Dean Khudson further explains,
lrTFaithjis primarily an act of volition. It springs out of the
vital needs and interests of the mind."
This practical necessity as the starting place of all
knowledge of reality is evident even in Augustine's intellectual
wanderings. '""This I "believed, sometimes more strongly, more
wealcly other-whiles; yet I ever "believed "bath that Thou wert,
and hadst a care of us; though I was ignorant, "both what was
to "be thought of Thy substance, and what way led or led "back
to Thee." It is evident then that "before Augustine was con-
vinced of the spiritual nature of reality, and "before he had
learned that the approach to reality was through personality,
he saw the practical necessity of faith as the ground work
in "building any philosophy involving reality. Shedd observes,
^"His ( A^p-ustine ' s ) speculation issues from his religious life
and feeling, and helps "both to clarify and deepen it. In other
words, Augustine is here practising upon his own celebrated
dictum, that faith precedes .scientific knowledge
.
The prac-
tical "belief of the truths of Christianity contains much that
is latent and tmdeveJoped . The Christian is wiser than he knows,"
Faith is thus a practical postulate.
The compel}, ing force of the universal needs and
1, Knudson, A. D. The Philosophy of Personalism
, p, 162,
3« Augustine, V. The Confessions , .-l.B.Pusev, VI, 5,
3. £frgUs"tine , A. TTTe" uonression o
r
" Augustine
,
Wffl. T, G-. bhedd,
p. xii.

24
iesirea of heart and mind are constantly evidenced in Augus-
tine. He writes, lnAnd I said, T Is Truth thereforefnothing
"because it i& net diffused through space finite or infinite? 1
And Thou criedst to me from afar; TYea, verily, I AM that I AM T
And I heard, as 3bhe heart heareth, nor had I room to doubt,
and I should sooner douht that I live, than that Truth is not,
T which is clearly seen "being understood "by those things whicto
are made 1 ." The intellectual . explanation of reality is lost
in difficulty and mystery, "but from the view of the facts of
life, "both internal and external, it has a fixed certainty
that is as real as personal life. Agai& we read: ^"For this
very thing was of all most to "be "believed, since no contentious
ness of "blasphemous questionings , of all that multitude which
I reed in the self-contradicting philosophers , could wring this
"belief from me, T That Thou art -whatsoever Thoi|wert , 1 ( what I
knew not,) and 'The the government of human things belongs to
Thee 1 ." Thus to ignore the ground of reality and man's inti-
mate relationship to that ground was for Augustine a practical
absurdity that he could not "be persuaded to embrace even during
the foggy days of skepticism. This agrees substantially with
personalism's position as stated "by B^pwne; '-3TT ];Ian is vail,
conscience, aspiration, and these are far more powerful
factors than the logical understanding,"
1. Augustine, A. The C onfessions
,
E.B.Pusey, VII, 10.
2. Ihid., VI, 5.
3. Bowne, B»F, Pcrsonalism , p. 376.
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II METAPHYSICS ACCORDING TO AUGUSTINE
A. The Problem Outlined
As we have already observed, personalism is
essentially a p%£toaa-jahy of metaphysics. It is not content
to go hunting only to receive the thrill of carrying a gun
and tramping the woods; it must "bring home the ,T game' T . In
keeping with this thought Bovme observes: "In addition we
must note that our knowing in its very nature implies being
in the sense of a content which is the object of the knowing.
Knowing as an act never ends itself as a pyschological fact."
Similarly nothing short of reality itself is an adequate goal
for the Bishop of Hippo. In his classic expression of the
abiding desire of his mind and heart Augustine opens wide the
door to his philosophy of life: 2"I desire to know God and
the soul," And when catechised by Reason, "And nothing more?",
his ready answer is, "Nothing whatever". Ultimate reality as
expressed in the infinite and finite personality are thus the
goal of all his intellectual pursuits. In keeping with this
Bowne declares, ^"Apart from the finite spirit, the only real-
ity is G-od, and his progressively unfolding plan and purpose
and work." Our method of viewing Augustin^s theory of reality
will be similar to the one previously adopted in studying his
epistemology. We shall use (for the most part) the ready-made
outline of Lean Khudson's historical analysis of personalism
in which he delineates the constitutive elements of its meta-
1. Bovme, B. P. Personalism
. p. 60
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physics. The o-itline as we have adopted it is as follows:
(1) the nature of reality as concrete and individual; (£) the
unity of the world and the world-grounfi; (3) reality in terms
of volition; (4) the phenom'enality of matter; (5) personality
ns the key to thw ultimately real; and (6) "building the thought
of God.
1. The nature of reality as c oncrete and individual ';
It is a common criticism of Augustine T s thought that
in his endeavor to grasp the "wholeness" of reality he frequently
failed to give proper place to the unique "otherness" that is
the rightful possession of the finite spirit. Augustine T s
piety thus at times would make his conception of the Absolute
to embrace all finite existences. This desire for unity on the
part of our religious genius seems tc put his position put of
harmony with the metaphysical pluralism of personalism. Dean
Khudson summarizes the personalistic position in this regard when
he ooserves that, ^"Metaphysical existence can "be predicated only
of that which is individual and c ; ncret&."
However, the s^ame author also warns us that 2the
pluralism for which personalism stands, is distinctly limited
in character. It presupposes an underlying Umity. Augustine
emphasizes this unity sometimes at the loss of the individual
s oul 1 s own " mutual othemess".
1. Khudson, A. D. The Philosophy of lersonalism, p. 179.
Ibid., p. 190.
T
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And yet there are marks of independence and separate-
ness allowed to the finite person in Augustine
T s writings.
Concerning God he distinctly says, lu So neither art Thou the
mind itself." Augustine's psychological insights were too
penetrating to allow him to consent permanently to the idea
that the human mind was "but part of the infinite intelligence.
Further, Augustine makes self-ceftainty the starting point in
his quest for reality. In his early work, The S oliloquies , we
hear Reason querying: s,,You, who desire to know yourself, do
you know that you are?" To this Augustine replies, "I do", hut
is unable to relate how he knows this. Also to the question,
3
"Do you know that you think?" his answer is equally a positive
affirmation.
Augustine is eertitaly not lost in the Ah solute when
he writes: ^ n In respect of these truths, I am not at all afraid
of the Academicians, who say, What if you are deceived; and if
I am deceived, "by this token I am." J^ugustine there is
nothing more certain than his own conscious identity and indiv-
iduality, and so we find him asking the rhetorical question?
^"But what is nearer to me than myself?," And again: ^"For
whence does a mind know another mind, if it does not know itself?"
Still another: "'lastly, when the mind seeks to know itself, it
already knows that it is a mind: otherwise it knows not whether
1. Augustine, \. The Confessions
. E«B. Pusey, Z, 25.
2. lugus*4ne, A. The Solilonuies
.
R.E. Cleveland, p. 51.
•3. loc. cit.
4. Augustine, A. The V/orks of -\urelius Mggqjjtine , M, Dods , Vol.
City of God, XI, 3.
5
.
Augustine, \, The Confessions
,
F.F.Pusey, X, 16.
6. Sehaff , P. Nic ene and Post^flTcene Fathers , Vol. Ill, On the
trinity, TX, 3.
7. ' IMd,
,
X, 4.
c
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it seeks itself, and perhaps seeks one thing while intending
to seek another." In this connection Siebeck observes:
llTAugustine always speaks a^ if only of himself , the indiv-
idual, to whom his personal feelings and sensations are the
main thing."
p
Dean Khudson also points out that "Augustine puts
self-certainty above the certainty of the object." It seems
clear enough to us also that Augustine is surer of his know-
ledge of the finite self than he is of the world of nature
about him. Instance: 3t,MFor we both are, and know that we are,
and delight in our being, and our knowledge of it. Moreover,
in these three things no true-seeming illusion disturbs us;
for we do not come into contact with these things by some
bodily sense, as we perceive the things outside of us , - col-
ours, e. g. , by seeing, sounds by hearing, smells by smelling,
tastes by tasting, - of all which sensible objects it is the
images resembling them, but not themselves which we perceive
in the mind and hold in the memory, and which excites us to
desire objects. But, without any ^elusive representation of
images or phantasms, I am most certain that I am, and that I
know and dfelight in this." Such a declaration as this does
not give us the impression that Augustine felt himself to be
an infinitesimal part of the All V/hich Is. The soul is not
lost in the world of things - it is superior to them. In the
1. Quirted by Harnack, A., History of Dogma
,
Vol. V, p. 107-8.
2. Khudson, A. D. The Philosophy of -/ersonalism
,
d. 119.
3. Augustine, A. The or Irs of
"~
Tufe"liU3 AuguSTthe T M. Dods
,
Vol.1, City of God/TT, 26.
4
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language of Siebeck, ^'Augustine , THE FIRST MODERN MAN , only
took it (the life of the soul) into consideration, in so far
as reflection upon it enabled him to conceive the inner charac-
ter of personal life as something really independent of the
outer world."
2, The unity of the world and world ground .
The idea of the Vb solute is not a starting point for
the philosophy of personalism, it is rather as Bowne described
it, a "limit notion". Personalism affirms that "a "basal
monism is necessary to meet the demands of reason." Bowne
warns us .however, that ITwe are not to think of this Supreme
Intelligence as a rigid monotony of "being, "but rather as the
perfect fullness of life, without o^^Bw?^'' There
is, consequently
,
nothing in the idea of personality which ex-
cludes that of absoluteness. Rather are we warranted in saying
only
with Lotze that personality in its completion is possible^to
the Absolute."
Augustine's description of the Absolute is not the
unrelated One but the self-sustaining One, Read him, 5"What
are Thou then, my God? .... Llost highest, most good, most po-
tent, most omnipotent, most merciful, yet most just; most hid-
den, yet most present; most beautiful, yet most string; stable,
yet incomprehensible; unchangeable, yet all changing; nevef mew,
1. Quoted by Harnack, A. History of Dogma
,
Vol. V, p. 108.
2, Khudson, A. D. The Philosophy of Personalism
, p. 202Q
.3.Bowne, B. P. Personalsim
, p. 145
.
4. Knudson, A. D. op. cit., p. 52.
5. Augustine, A. The Confessions
.
E.B.Pusey, I, 4.
9
30
never old; all-renewing, and 1 "bringing age upon the proud, and
they know it not T ; ever working, ever at rest; still gathering,
yet nothing lacking; supporT^ filling, and overspreading; crea-
ting, nourishing and maturing; seeking, yet having all things."
It is true that Augustine T g idea oi" a"k "times seems
to "be that of static personality, "but on the whole his descrip-
tions of the Supreme Being are "best understood as that of a
self-sufficient personality who alone is the complete exprcss-
ion/bf the fulness of reality. He v/rites, ^ ,T7or that is
chiefly said to Be, which always exists in one and the same
way, which is every way like itself; which can in no way lie
injured or changed; which is not subject to time; which cannot
at one time he other than another, For this is what is most
truly said to Be." With the same thought he writes, SlVAnd I
"beheld the other things "below Thee, and I pereeived, that they
neither altogether are, nor' altogether are not, for they are,
since they are from Thee, "but are not, "because they are not
what Tnou art. For that truly is, v/hich remains unchangeahly."
But 'ugustine is fundamentally in agreement with
personal&sm in recognizing the essential unity of the world-
ground. ' ;"And therefore, whether we consider the whole "body of
the world, its figure, qualities, and orderly movement, and
also all the "bodies which are in it; or whether we consider all
life, either that which nourishes and maintains, as the life of
1. Augustine, 1. The Confessions
,
E. B
.
Pusey. de mor, l.Ianich.
c. 1, quoted in footnote, p. 134.
2. Augustine, A. op. cit,_, VII, 11.
3. Schaff , P. ITicene and Post-Hicene Fathers
,
Vol. II, The
City of Cod, VIII, c. 6.
Ic
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the trees; or that which, "besides this, has also sensation, as
the life of the "beasts; or that which adds to all thesa intel-
ligence, as the life of man; or that which does not need the
support of nutriment, "but only maintains, feels, understands,
as itihe life of angels, - all can only BE through Him v/ho
absolutely IS .... But to Him to live, to understand, to "be
"blessed, are to BE." The unity of the universe then is found
for Augustine in the active personality of God.
3« Reality in terms of volition
.
For * personalism, "being must ultimately "be active
and causal if it is to "be something more than a concept. The
soul is a mental agent rather than a mere substance. ^It (per-
sonalism) holds that reality consists in the pov,rer of action."
3In fact, "reality is cause" and #his 4causality duust "be inter-
preted in terms of volition."
Harnack testifies concerning Augustine, 5"The kernel
of our nature exists indisputably according 'to Augustine in
our will: therefore, in order that the VERITAS, the SCIRE DEUIvI
ET ANIMAM may "be able to obtain supremacy, and become, as it
were, the unique function of man, the will must be won on its
behalf .... ACCORDINGLY THE FREEING- OF THJ '.TILL IS ULTIMATELY
THE SUBSTITUTION OF TIE SUPREMACY OF THE INTELLECT FOR THAT
OF THE Y/ILL." In his struggle for spiritual emancipation
1. Kntidson, A. D. The Philosophy of ~ ersonalicm
, p. 203.
2. loc. cit,
3. Ibid., p. 205.
4. Ibid.
, p. 178.
5.Harnack, A. History of Dogma
,
Vol. V, footnote, p. 123.
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Augustine points out clearly that his "bondage lay in the will.
ln 7/hich thing I was sighing for," ho writes, "hound as I was
,
not with a:io Lhcr T s irons, hut "by my own iron will." And
again, 2,TBut this raised me a little into Thy light, that I
knew as well that I had a will, as that I lived: when then I
did will or nill anything, I was most sure, that no other
than myself did will and nill: and I all but saw that there
was the cause of my sin."
Augustine again writes in discussing the question of
foreknowledre
,
3nFor what does it hel.p him (Cicero) to say that
nothing takes place without a cause, "but that every cause is
not fatal, there "being a fortuitous cause, a natural cause,
and a voluntary cause? It is sufficient that he confesses
that whatever happens must he preceded "by a cause. For we say
that those causes which are called fortuitous are not the mere
name for the ahsence of causes, hut are only latent, and we
attribute them either to the will of the true God, or to that
of spirit of some kind or other. And as to natural causes, we
by no means separate them from the will of Him who is the
author and framer of all nature. But now as to voluntary
causes. They are referable either to God, or to angels, or to
men, or to animals of whatever description, if indeed tho&e
instinctive movements of animals devoid of reason, by which,
in accordance with their own nature, they seek or shun various
1. Augustine, A.. The C onfessions S.B.Pusey, Vlllm 5.
2 . Augustine, V, Op . cit . , VII , 3
.
3. Augustine, a. The V/orks of Aurelius Augustine , M Dods
,
The City of God, Vol.T7 V, 9.
#
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icings, are to "be called wills.... And from these we conclude
that there are no efficient causes of all things which come to
pass unless voluntary causes, that is, &uch as belong to that
nature which is the spirit of life.... The spirit of life,
therefore, which quickens all things, and is the creator of
every "body, and of every created spirit, is God himself, the
uncreated spirit.' 1 In another instance Augustine affirms the
Eternity of the Creator and declares that, 1:,His substance is
in no ways changed "by time, nor His will separate from His
substance
In the foregoing Au^gustine seems to reduce all
causation to will and the final source of all causative power
to the divine spirit or will. This is in s,greement with Bowne's
position as he states: "From our point of view, the reason for
the uniformity of things, or the pjfQgvess of things, must he
found in the will and plan of G-od." Augustine further affirms
the spiritual nature of causation: ^"Material causes, the^fore
,
which may rather "be said to "be made than to make, are not to he
reckoned ^mong efficient causes, because they can only do what
the wills of spirits do by them. Hov;, then, does an order of
causes willeh is certain to the foreknowledge of G-od necessitate
that there should be nothing which is dependent on our wills,
when our -ills themselves have a very important place in the
order of causes?' 1
1.Augustine, A. The Confessions
,
E.B.Pusey, XI, 15.
S.Bowne, B. P. Personalism
, p. 211.
3. Augustine, A.. The V/orks of Apre litis Augustine
,
M. Dods
Vol. I, The City of C/6T7 V, 9. 1
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A.U gustine affirms the immediate awareness of active
volitional powers in the human personality. He writes, ^-"Our
wills, therefore, EXIST as WILLS, and do themselves whatever we
do "by willing, and which would not "be don e if we were unwilling."
He also posits human freedom as "being in perfect harmony
with the thought of the divine will. Writing to Cicero he says,
"He therefore, like a truly great and wise man, and one who
consulted very much and very skilfully for the good of humanity,
of those two chose the freedom of the will, to confirm which he
denied the foreknowledge of future things; and thus, wishing to
make men free, he makes them sacrilegious. But the religious
mind chooses "both, confesses "both, and maintains "both "by the
faith of piety. 1 ' Freedom to the finite personality fa* Augustine
is not contradictory to the wider scope of knowledge granted
the infinite mind. In the s me connection he writes of 3,T the
free exercise of our wills" and declares that God is not ignorant
of our wills.
It is fair to note here, however, that while freedom.' in
the sense of free choice is never openly destroyed "by Augustine -
yet the theological limitations that heAimposes upon free will
are such as would logically lead to determinism. For Augustine,
nothing "but a "good" will is truly free. In this connection
H^arnack criticises: ^"Augustine contradicted hinself in main-
taining that all ability to attain goodness had "been lost, and
in yet admitting that freedom of choice - the decisive thing -
remained.
"
1. Augustine, A. The V/orks of Aurelius Augustine
,
M. Dods,
Vol. I, The City of GodT, V, 10"
2. Ibid.
,
V, 9.
3. Loc. cit.
4.H arnack, A. History _of Dogma , Vol. V, p. 217.

For Augustine, there are no realities in 34a
the universe "but will. He declares, will, therefore I
am." And again, '""For the will commandeth that there "be a
will; not another, "but itself." Hamack observes in this
connection: ^"Augustine himself so presented the case that no inner
state and no activity of thought existed apart from the will."
Again, in writing of his own struggle for a true spiritual
freedom
1, Cell, Cr. C. Seminar on .Vagus t i ne t class room notes.
2 .Augustine, A. The "Confessions
,
E, B, Pusey, VIII, 9,
3. Harnack, A. History of ^ ogma , Vol. V, footnote, p. 123.
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Augustine observes, lnMyself when I was deliberating upon serv-
ing the Lord my God now, as I had long purposed, it was I who
willed, I who nilled, I, I myself."
Augustine also identifies the divine energy with the
divine will and this will is God Himself. 2,,Hor art Thou against
Thy will constrained to any thing, since Thy will is not greater
than Thy power. But greater should it "be, were Thyself greater
than Thyself. For the will ' and" power of God, is God Himself."
Eucken concludes: 3"Just as, in his view, the life of
the soul is fundamentally and chiefly the striving for well-being
and self-realisation, so its cpmplctest expression is the will,
as that in which life attains unity and is raised to full activ-
ity. In fact, it is even affirmed that all beings are nothing
but will (nihil aliud quam voluntates) , T the will is the com-
prehensive principle of all activities of mind T X^eizelmann)
.
This conviction became steadily, more pronounced throughout
Augustine's life, and separated him further and further from
the intellectualism of antiquity."
4. The phenomenali ty of matter.
a.Bovme declares emphatically that "Hume did philos-
ophy a good service in showing that Nature presents nothing but
succession; ,T and this is 'rigidly true. As the leading exponent of
the personalistic position Bowne points out that 5tt there are two
1. Augustine, \. The Confessions
.
E.B.Pusey, VIII, 9.
2. Augustine, A. TTTe .vorfes of Aurelius Augustine, I.'. Dods
Vol. I, The City of God,~T7T~9. *
3. Eucken, R. The Problem of Human Life, p. 267.
TT
4
»
So^e, B. P. Herbert Gpencer's Laws of'the Knowable TVip^ E^lnnder, C.IZTI (Jan. 1873), p. 21.
5. Lowne,^. p. Personalism
. p. 112.
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^in&s of reality, phenomenal and ontological." Then he warns,
ln Only the latter is substantial; the former is real for and in
experience; but reflective thought shows that it is properly
phenomenal, existing only in and for intelligence."
Augustine approaches this thought .-hen he writes con-
cerning God, 2,TBut if ffe knew all that He made, He made only
those things which He had known. V/hence flows a very striking
"but true conclusion, that this world could not "be known to us
unless it existed, but could not have existed unless it had "been
known to C-od. ,T T^his seems to us to "be an affirmation of the
ideality of nature and that matter is real only in and for
intelligence
.
In our later development of Augustine T s thought of
God we shall deal more particularly v/ith his emancipation from
materialism.
As a corollary -of the phenomenality of matter, per-
sonalism declares that space, too, is phenomenal, ^"Without
spacial objects there v/ould be no space. Its phenomenality,
therefore, is a corollary of the ph enomenality of matter."
Lilcewise the ideality of time is affirmed by personalism, ^"To
be ontologically real, time must be active, but to so regard it
is to contradict the time idea."
Augustine has the conception of the ideality of time.
In dealing with Augustine T s studies regarding the occupation
1. Eowne, B. P. Personalism
, p. 112.
2. Augustine, A. . The .orks of lurelius Augustine t M. Dods,
Vol. I, The City of Go£, II, 1U7
3.Khudson, A. D . The Philosophy of Personalism:
, p. 235.
4. loc. cit.
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of God prior to creation, Pringle-Pattison observes,
1
"3t.
Augustine, who twice addresses himself to meet the criticism,
wl»s a technical victory by the argument that time itself was
created along with the world of moving things "by which its
duration is measured, so that there could lie no lapse of un-
occupied time "before the creation, there "being in eternity
neither "before nor after.... Cum tempore, non in tempore is
Augustine's distinction; the world was not created in time "but
together with time." Commenting on this quotation from A.ug-
ustine, Dean Khudson writes: 2"The temporal is thus coexistant
with the cosmic process, "but unreal apart from it."
Augustine suggests the infinite divisibility of time.
He starts with a hundred years, reduces it to the current
year, then the present month, dayy hour^ and finally he observes
4
"Yea, that on^e hour passeth away in flying particles. What-
soever of it hath flown away, is past; whatsoever remaineth is
to come. If -an instant of time "be conceived, which cannot "be
divided into the smallest particles of moments, that alone is
it, which may "be called present. Whloh yet flies with such
speed from future to past, as not to "be lengthened out with
the least stay. For if it "be, it is riivided into past and fu-
ture. The present hath no space. V/here then is the time
which we call long? Is it to come?"
Augustine elsewhere queries, '^"Whence it seemed to me
1. Pringle-Pattison. ',.S, The Idea at God in the Light of
Recenj Philosophy
,
p. 303.
8 . Xhud s on , t . 1) . The Philosophy of Personalism , p. 237,
3. Augustine, A. The C'onf o ssi oris T E.B.Pusey , XI, 15,
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5. ifcia
;
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•that time is nothing else than protraction; "but what, I know
not; and I marvel, if it "be not of the mind itself?" Here is
is a hint that 'possibly time is a distension of the mindt itself.
And in his continued scrutiny we read, lj,What then is it I meas-
ure? where is the short syllable by which I measure? where the
long which I measure? Both have soundedo nave flown, passed
away, are no more; and yet I measure, and confidently answer
( so far as is presumed on a practised sense) that as to space
and time this ByllaAle is single, that double.,.. It is not then
themselves, which now are not, that I measure, hut something in
my memory, which there remains fixed. It is in thee, my mind,
that I measure times.... In thee I meastre times; the impression,
which things as they pass "by cause in thee , remains even when
they are gone; this it is which is still present. I measure not
the things which pass "by to make this impression... Cither then
this is time, or I do not 1 measure time." In this psychological
study Augustine observes that his space and time measurements
are the work of the mind and are not dependent upon the object-
o ... . , . i j. , i m, seems to .lve presence of the things being measured. Thus he suggest- that
the "Two great phantoms of space and time" (for th ey rimst stand
or fall together) were largely conceptual,
5. Personality as the key to the ultimately real
.
In the language of Dean Khudson, ^"The metaphysics of
1. Augustine, A. The Confessioira
,
E.B.Pusey, XI, 27.
2, Khudson, A. D . The Philosophy of Personalism
. p. 237.

39
personal! sit^iay "be summed up in the statement that personality
is^ey to reality." And again, 1,TFrom every point of view it
is thus evident that in personality we have the orown of the
personalistic system, the keystone in its arch, the master
light of all our metaphysical seeing/'
On the same subject Bo rne writes, -^"Personality can
never he construed as a product or a compound; it can only "be
experienced as a fact.... Y/henever we attempt to go "behind this
fact we are trying to explain the explanation.... When we have
lived caiid described the personal life we have done all that is
possible in sane and sober speculation. If we try to do more
we only fall a prey to abstractions. This self-conscious exist-
ence is the truly ultimate fact."
Augustine reveals a decided personalistic emphasis in
his constant and dominant interest in the finite and infinite
personalities. 3"God and the soul" - the soul and its God; this
is his constant theme.
Augustine T c- interest in "the personal values is indic-
ated "by the way in which he frequently contrasts the import of
man T s personal "being with the ramifications of nature, - always
decidedly with the view of minimizing the starry heavens and
elevating the personal worth, 4 "The knowledge of things terres-
tial and celestial is commonly thought much of "by men. Yet
those doubtless judge better who prefer to that knowledge J the
knowledge of themselves; and that mind is more praiseworthy which
1. Khudson, Af D. The Philosophy of Personalism
, p. 238,
8, Bowne, B. P. Personalism , pT TR>5~,
3. Augustine, A. The Soliloquies
, R ,E .Cleveland
, p. 10.
4. Setoff, P. N icene and Post-TTTcene Fathers, Vol. Ill, On
the Trinity, IV,
1
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knows even its ovm weakness, than that which, without
regard to
this, searches out, and even comes to know, the ways
of the stars,
or which holds fast such knowledge already acquired, while
ignorant
of the way by which itself to enter into its ovm proper
health
and strength." Again, llT?or Thy spiritual works are before
these
corporeal works, celestial though they he, and shining."
Eucken observes this controlling interest in Augustine's
thought and writes: 2"The development of Augustine's thought is
in a pre-eminent degree -an expression of personality, in fact,
of direct personal life. All his work, indeed, serves the one
purpose of the unfolding and enjoyment ojf his ovm Toeing; in all
the varied form of activity the ultimate goal remains the same,
the well-being of the entire nature. Happiness, blessedness , this
it is upon which the whole thought and passionate longing of the
man are concentrated - happiness, not in the restricted sense of
the earlier Latin Fathers, hut as the complete satisfaction of the
inner nature, as the vivifying of all the powers, as "blessedness
extending to the deepest foundations of "being." This suggested
relationship/of happiness to "being is reflected in the following
passage from Augustine: "Further, as there i§ no one who does
not wish to "be happy, so there is no one who does not wish to
he. Tor how con he "be happy, If he is nothing."
Harnack also points out that 4 "He (Augustine) found
what had been long sought fort 'the making of the inner life the
1. Augustine A.. The Confessions
, E.B.Pusey, III, 6.
2. Eucken, R. The Problem of Human Life
, p. 211.
3. Augustine, A. The WorKs of Aurelius Augustine
,
M. Dods,
Vol. I, The City of ^od, XI, 267
4.Harnack, A. The History of Dogma
,
Vol.V, p. 107.
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anting point of reflection on the world," thus,
1
"The command
ijifoqf thyself' #t*J%(/f°V) heaame for him the way to God."
Reality is thus to he investigated and discovered through per-
sonality, according to Augustine.
E
"Crod"
,
writes Ugustine
,
"beneath whom, in whom, with whom, is everything: wko hast made
man after Thine own image and likeness, which he who knows him-
self discovers." Here we find the suggestion that man's own
personality should properly he the first principle of meta-
physics .
Augustine recognizes something of the profound depth
and inexhaustible nature of personality. It is the key to the
real hut is itself, unanalyzahle . We read:
3
" Man himself is a
great deep, whose vcry'hairs Thou numberest T , L^rd, T and they
fall not to the ground without Thee T . And yet are the hairs of
his head easier to he numbered than his feelings, and the heat-
ings of his heart." And again: -""Great is the power of memory,
a fearful thing, my
€J d> a deep and "boundless manifoldness
;
and this thing is the mind, and this am I myself. What am I
then, my Cod? What nature am I? A. life various and manifold,
and exceeding mmmense."
''"Augustine really makes memory the totality of
experience," this is the observation of Dr. Cell. And it is in
the wide range of his own conscious personal experience that
Augustine learns something of the vastness within the limits
1. HarT1£, c ]r, A. History of Dogma , Vol. V, p. 107.
2. Augustine, A. The S oliloquies
,
R. ..Cleveland, p. 7.
3. Augustine, A. The Confes sions
,
R.R.Pusey, IV, 14.
4. Ihid., X, 17. ;
5. Cell, G-.C. Lectures in Se:.:inar on 'ugustine
.
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of his own personality. ln Great is this force of memory, ex-
cessive
,
great , my God; a large and "boundless chamber J v rho
ever sounded the "bottom thereof? yet is this a power of mine,
and "belongs unto my nature; nor do I comprehend all that I am.
Therefore is the mind too strait to contain itself. And where
should that "be, which it containeth not of itself? Is it without
it, and not within? how then cloth it not comprehend (contain)
itself? A wonderful admiration surprises me, amazement seizes
me upon this.'' Thus the totality of personal "being for Augustine,
is larger than the intellect. Again we read: '""He made also
man after his own image and likeness, in the mind: for in that
is the image of G-od. This is the reason why the mind cannot
"be comprehended even by itself, "because in it is the image of
God."
In somewhat the same vein wejread from Bowne's pen:
3
"Man himself in his essential personality is as unpictura"ble
and formless as God." Ana" again: 4,1 Intellect explains every-
thing "but itself. It exhibits other things as its own products
and as exemplifying its own principles; but it nearer explains
itself."
But despite the inscrutability of the mindm there is..-
an immediate ,self-certainty which makes for unity in the active,
personal life, according to Augustine. Instance: " In brief, by
all these three things, it is I that remember, I that understand,
1. Augustine, A. The Confessions , xJ.B.'Pusey, X, 8.
2. Schaff , P. Mo one and ^ ost-ITioene Kathers , Vol. Ill, On
the Creed, c. 2.
3. Bowne, B. P. Personalism , p. 266.
4 . Ibid.
,
p. 215
.
5. Schaff , P. op. cit. Vol. Ill, On the Trinity, XV, 22.
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I that love, whom an neither memory, nor understanding, nor
love, "but who have them." Augustine also queries: ^-"Further
,
what in it is so known to itself, as that it lives? And it
cannot at once "be a mind, and not love, while it has also
something over and above, viz., that it understands: for the
souls of the beasts also live, but clo not understand. As there-
fore a mind is a whole mind, so it lives as a whole. But it
knows that it lives." And continuing: 2" Lastly, when the mind
seeks to know itself, it already knows that it is a mind: other-
wise it knows not whither it seeks itself, and perhaps seeks
one thing while intending to seek another." Here we find the
answer to the questions of abstract thought regarding identity,
change, one and many, in man's conscious personal life.
The key to the ultimately real is thus to be
found first and last in man T s own personal being. It is the
starting point of sober reflection and the final word in all
conclusions regarding metaphysics. In a memorable passage in
i
The Concessions Augustine suggests the common error of mankind
in ignoring the key within thffiir grasp that opens the doors to
abiding reality. ^"And men go abroad to admire the heights of
mountains, the mighty billows o^ the sea, the long courses of
the rivers, the compass of the oeean, and the circuits of the
stars, and pass themselves by." He also points out that this
was his own error when engulfed la materialistic modes of thought
1. Schaff
,
P. N icene and l-'ost-ITicene Fathers
,
Vol. Ill, On
the Trinity. X, c. 4.
2. loc. cit.
S.Augustine, A
.
The Confessions, E.B.Pusey, X, 8.
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and the life unethical. -L,, A.ncl behold, Thou wert within, and I
abroad, and there I searched for Thee; deformed I, plunging amid
those fair forms, which Thou hadst made." Similarly, Pj"Thou
hadst made me wiser, yet did I walk in darkness, and in slippery
places, and sought Thee abroad out of myself, and found not the
God of my heart."
Commenting on this emphasis found in iugustine, Siebeck
concludes: ^"The external owes all its importance and value in
his eyes to the form it assumes as reflected in the internal.
Everything is dominated not "by problems of nature and the State
and the secular ethics, but by those of the deepest v/ants of mind
and heart, of love and faith, hope and conscience. The proper
objects and the moving forces of his speculation are not found in
the relation/ of inward to outward, bfi.t of inner to innermost, to
the sense of vision of G-od in the heart." Thus, 4"the inner
subject of its (intellect's) reflections was to consist, hence-
forth, not in the external world, nor in the internal discussed
by means of analogy with, and method of, the external, but in
the kernal of personality, conscience in connection with emotion
and will."
Augustine sees the footprints of God in the world of
nature about him, but the real key to an understanding of the
Supreme Being is to be found within the transgressor's own inner
life. '"He made these (souls), nor is He far off. For He did not
1. Augustine, A.. The Confess ions. E.B.Pusey, I. 27.
2 .Ibid., VI, 1. I
4* Ibid
63 HaMaok; A. History of Dogma
, Tor. V
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make them, and so depart, "but they are of Him, and in Him.
See there He is,, where truth is loved. He is within the very
heart, yet hath the heart strayed from Him. T G-o hack into your
heart, ye treansgressors ' , ana cleave fast to Him that hath
made you."
In 'She City of God he repeats this thought in even
clearer fashion,
-^-"But we are men, created in the^Lmage of our
Creator, whose eternityfis true, and whose truth is eternal,
whose love is eternal and true....; and, thenfore
,
while, as
we run over all the works which He has established, we may
detect as it were, His footprints, now more and now less dis-
tinct even in those things that are "beneath us, since they could
not so much as exist, or he "bodied forth in any shape, or fol-
low and observe any law, had they not been made by Him who
supremely is, and is supremely good and supremely wise; yet
in ourselves beholding His image , let us, like the younger son
of the gospel, come to ourselves, and arise and return to Him
from whom by our sin we had departed."
Personality reaches its pinnacle in Augustine^
estimation when he describes it in several instances as a&3T*Uhat
alone which He (God) Himself alone is higher, (or better)."
And the ladder by which the finite spirit approaches the In-
finite One is described as being within man 'himself
. ^"V/here
then are the ladders? For we behold so great an interval be-
1. Augustine, A. The ./orks of urolius Augustine
,
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tween heaven and earth, there is so wide a separation, and so
great a space of regions between: we wish to clim"b thither, we
see no ladder; do we d&ccive ourselves, "because we sing the Song
of Degrees, that fts , the song of ascent? We ascend unto heaven,
if we think: of C-od , who hath made ascending steps in the heart.
What is. to ascend in heart? To advance towards C-od." And again,
"'""By my very soul will I ascend to Him" Thus Augustine knew
reality in so far as it was like himself. He was indeed his own
microcosm, And in the language of Dean Khudson, ^"I-Tot only is
the ego necessarily involved in all knowledge of reality, "but it
is in the ego that all fundamental principles of thought have their
seat and find their meaning,... Only as reality is lifted to the
personal plane does it "become amenable to the demands of reason."
6. Building the thought of G-od.
Augustine T s thought of God is so vital to his entire
philosophic structure that it seems fitting at this point to
trace somewhat the development of his religious thought.
In his youth we find (according to The Confessions )
that Augustine beemme engulfed in the error of Manichaeism; for
it afforded him a comfortable atmosphere for his early rational-
istic tendencies. It was also freely critical of the Scriptures
and afforded some kind of explanation for the problem of evil in
its ethical dualism. This fantastic mode of thought occupied the
attention of the young intellectual for nine years until he finally
1. Augustine, A, The Confessions
,
E.B.Pusey, X, 7.
2. Khudson, A.D. The Philosphy of Personalism
, p. 246.
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became convinced that Hani chaeism was simply a philosophy of
negation .
From Manichaeism, Augustine drifted into materialistic
modes of thought and for two years, followed the zig-zag path
of the T, doubters M . However, in the course of his intellectual
wanderings he stumbled upon certain Neo-Platonic writings which
gave him a spiritual concept of "being. Heretofore, he declares,
he had been 1,rg;ross -hearted, nor clear even to myself, whatsoever
was not extended over certain spaces, nor diffused, nor condensed
nor swelled out, or did not or could not receive some of these
dimensions, I thought to "be altogether nothing." Likewise con-
cerning G-od himself, he writes, 2"So also did I endeavor to con-
ceive of Thee, Life of my life, as vast, through infinite spaces
on every side penetrating the whole mass of the universe, and
"beyond it, every way, through immeasurable "boundless spo.ces; so
that the e'arth should have Thee, the heaven have Thee, all things
have Thee, and they "be "bounded in Thee, and Thou "bounded no-
where." But the ITeo-platonic writings afforded Augustine his
emancipation from this crass materialism, and at the close of a
rather long drawn out struggle, he concludes that reality is
spiritual rather than spatial.
Thus we read later in his experience: 3"But what do I
love, when I love Thee? not bea.uty of "bodies, nor the\fair har-
mony of time, nor the "brightness of the light, so gladsome to
our eyes, nor sweet melodies of varied songs, nor the fragrant
1. ugustine , A. The Confessions, E.B.Pusey, 711, 1.
2. Ibid,
,
VII, 1.
3. Ibid,
,
X, 6,
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smell of flowers, and ointments, and. spices, not manna and honey,
not limbs acceptable to embracements of flesh. Hone of these I
love, when I love my God; and yet I love a kind of light, and mel-
ody, and fragrance, and meat, and embracement, when I love my God,
the light, melody
,
fragrance, meat, embracement of my inner man: where
there shineth unto my soul, what space cannot contain, and there
soundeth, what time beareth not away, and there smelleth, what
"breathing disperse th not, and there tasteth, what eating dimin-
ish6th not, and there clingeth, what satiety divorceth not. This
is it which I love, when I love my God."
In his work On the Trinity Augustine states emphatically,
"Fur certainly He is neither earth or heaven; nor, as it were
,
earth and heaven; nor any such thing as we do not see, "but which
perhaps is in heaven.... For it is written that T G-od is light 1
;
not in sutfh way as these eyes see, but in such way as the heart
sees, when it is said, He is truth ( reality ). TT
God is to be known for Augustine through "his works"
but his emphasis is never upon the celestial and shining works
of nature, but upon man himself who is not only from God, but of
God. Thus God is like -man, for man is like God. Instance: 2
"But
T from Him T
,
does not mean the same as T of Him T
. ex ipso and de
ipso). For what is of Him may be said to be from Him; but not
everything that is from Him is rightly said to be of Him. For
from Him are heaven and earth, because He made them; but not of Him
1. Schaff
,
P. ITicene and Post*Hioene Fathers, Vol. Ill On
the Trinity, Yltt^T,
2. Ibid.., Hature of Good; Against the Kanichaeans
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"because they are not of His substance. As in the case of a
man who "begets a son and makes a house, from himself is the son,
from himself is the house, "but the son is of him, the house is
of eart£ and wood." No clearer illustration of the affinity
"between personality and reality could "be asked for than this one
that Augustine gives us in the suggested relation and kinship of
father and son. Also, in the striking contrast he draws "be-
tween nature and personality, the odds are certainly in favor
of the latter and nature is left rather "wooden".
Harnack points out that lnAugustine was so strongly
possessed "by the feeling, never, indeed, clearly formulated,
that GOD IS A PERSON whom we must trust and love, that this con-
viction was even a latent standard in his Trinitarian speculations.
This thought is suggested in the following passage: ?"Q Thou
Good omnipotent, who so carest for every one of us, as if Thou
caredst for him only; and so for all, as if they were "but one I"
In building his thought of God from a philosophical
standpoint Augustine lays great stress upon the value judgnents
,
the idea of woljth, and upon the person of Supreme Good. '^This
is fundamentally the personalistic emphasis.
Dean Knudson reminds us, 4 n In str i c t logic one cannot
pass from what ought to "be to what is, or from subjective inter-
ests to objective facts, But in actual life the transition is
made, and it is made in one form or another "by everyone,... In
1. Harnack, A. History of Dogma
,
Vol. V, p. 128,
2. Augustine, /,. The Concessions
,
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4. Ibid.
, p. 307-8,
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spite of ourselves the ideals of life assert themselves. They
"become determining factors in "belief.... Han Will not allow
the element of worth to "be eliminated from thwir world-view."
Augustine himself in his quest for spiritual deliv-
erance and emancipation from the arid waste* of materialism .
indicates that
-^he "began his journey forward at the point where
he "began to prefer one thing to another. He writes: 2,,And I
did in my inmost soul "believe that Thou wert incorruptible , and
uninjurable , and unchangeable; "because though not loiowing whence
or how, yet I saw plainly and was sure.,: that that which may "be -
corrupted must "be inferior to that which cannot; what could not
"be injured I preferred unhesitatingly to what could receive in-
jury; the unchangeable to things subject to change. My heart
passionately cried out against all these phantoms, and with this
one "blow I sought to "beat away from the eye of my mind all that
unclean troop, which "buzzed around it." And when the final in-
sight came concerning the essential spiritual nature of reality,
it arrived on the wings of a value judgment. Thus he relates,
3
"When without all doubt, it (the reasoning faculty) cried out,
'That the unchangeable was to "be preferred to the changeable^;
whence also it laifew That Unchangeable; which, unless it had in
some way known, it had had no sure ground to prefer it to the
changeable. And thus with the flash of one trembling glance
it arrived at THAT Y/HICH IS. And then I saw Thy 'invisible
1. Cell, G. C. Seminar on Augustine
, class room notes.
2. Augustine, The C onfessions
,
E.B.Pusey, VII, 1.
3. Ibid., VII, 171
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things understood by the things which were made.
Augustine repeatedly speaks of God as the Highest Good.
God is truth and Go& is power, to he sure, hut
/uigustine's em-
phasis lies in the fact that God is good. This he
undoubtedly
learned from Plato . Augustine observes:
lM Who, then, hut the
most miserable will deny that he is blessed, who enjoys that
whiah he loves, and loves the true and highest good? But
the
true and highest gbod according to Plato is God." This thought
is repeated by Augustine again and again. 2 "The perfection of
all our good^ things and our perfect good things and our perfect
good is God."
As Harnack puts it, 3 "The T summum bonum T now meant
that which ought to be," and 4"the Supreme Being is the Supreme
Good; He is a person." In his work On the Trinity
,
iugustine
writes, ^"So God is to be loved, not this and that good, biiit the
good itself. ^or the good that must be sought for the soul is
not one above which it is to fly by judging, but to which it is
to cleave by loving; and what can this be except God? N _j}t a
good mind, or a good angel, or the good heaven, but the good
good." In fact, God is considered better than the best that
finite mind can desire Or think concerning him. 6"And nothing
is more exalted above us than God." Again, 7"For never soul
was, nor shall be, able to conceive any think which may be
better than Thou, who art the sovereign and the best good. But
1. Schaff , P. Hicene and Post*Nicene Fathers, Vol. II, The
City of God, '
2, Ibid-/,. Vol. TV, On' the Morals of the. Catholic Church, c. 8
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gince most truly and certainly, the incorruptible is preferable
to the corruptible, (as I did now prefer it,) then, wert Thou not
incorruptible, I could in thought have arrived at something better
than my God. 'Then then I saw the incorruptible to be preferable
to the corruptible, there ought I to seek for Thee." H^ere
Augustine declares empahatically for the validity of value judg-
ments. As Siebeck puis it, the supreme decision no longer must
rest on reason alone, but on lrT the irresistible force of the in-
ternal"
.
Augustine also sees the value of the ideal in practical
living when he declares, ^""For he lives ill who does not believe
well". This has some bearing to the position of personalism
which holds, 3,T that the rejection of the belief of God would
have disastrous consequences for the higher spiritual interests
of men." This too was Bowne's position.
Even in his view of the Trinity with all of its com-
plicated implications, Augustine appraaches the problem from the
psychological point of view rather then the social. He empha-
sizes unity in consciousness rather than three distinct centers
of consciousness. Again his emphasis is akin to that of per-
sonalism. God is for Augustine the perfect personality and even
in his Trinitarian views his concepts are based large^ on the
insights obtained from his ovm nsc.ture . The Trinity is
-"repro-
duced in every being, but particularly in the human soul."
1. Quoted by Harnack, k. History of Dogma
,
Vol. V, p. 108.
2. Augustine, A. The Works of A-ureTTus Augus tine
,
M$ "IJo&S,, Vol. I,
The City of God, V, 10.
3. Khudson, A.D. The Philosophy of Personalism
, p. 312.
4. Eucken, R. The Problem of Humag Life
, p, 218.
i
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Augustine writes, -"-"which of us comprehendeth the
Almighty Trinity?.... I would that man would consider these
three, that are in themselves . . . . Now the three I speak of are
to Be , to Know, and to ".'Till.... In these three then, let him
discern that can, how inseparable a life there is, yea one life
one mind, and one essence, yea lastly, how inseparable a dis-
tinction there is, and yet a distinction. Surely a man hath" it
"before him; let him look into himself, and see, and tell me,"
And again, ° TT The mind itself, end its knowledge, and love, as
the third, is a sort of image of the Trinity; and these three
are one, and one substance
.
,T
Commenting on the above approach, Shedd observes,
"Augustine starts with the assumption that man was maffe in
the image of the TRIUNE god, the God of revelation; not in the
image of the God of natural religion, or the untriune deity of
the nations. Consequently, it is to be expected that a trin-
itarian analogue can be found in his mental constitution. If
man is God T s image, he will show traces of it in every respect.
All acknowledge that the Divint uM'ty, "and all the communicable
attributes, have their finite correspondents in the unity, and
attributes of the human mind. But the Latin father goes furthe
than this. This,' in his view, is not the whole of the Divine
image. V/hen God says, T Let US make man in OUR ' image , after OUR
likeness', (Gen. 1:36), Augustine understands these words to be
1. Augustine, "... The Confessions
. E.B.Pusey, 'XIXI, 11.
2 ,3chaff
,
P. ft ic ene -and Post-j'ic ene Fathers. Vol. ITI On
the Trinity, IX, c. 4 and~ ' 1
-1 ?• Ibid-.» Vol. Ill, On the Trinity. Introduction by './.G.T.
Shedd, p. 4, r
(*
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spoken BY the Trinity, and OF the Trinity - by and of the true
God, the God of revelation: the Father, Son and Holy Spirit,
one God."
Augustine follows out his psychological study and uses
the finite memory, understanding and will (or love) as aAalogous
with the Father, the Son, and Wie Holy Spirit, respectively.
He writes, ^"1 have undoubtedly taken pains as far as I could,
not indeed so that the thing might be seen face to face, but
that it might be seen by this likeness in an enigma, in how
small a degree soever, by connective, in our memory and under-
standing, to intimate God and the Father and God and the Son....
But „I have shown nothing in this enigma respecting the Holy
Spirit such as might appear to be like Him, except our wwn will,
or love, or affection, which is a stronger will." Thus, ^"the
most perfect image of the Trinity, says Augustine, is the thought
of the inner man, not sensuous and external cognition, but that
of the 2 elf- consciousness ; as the three elements of which he
gives prominence to, the MEMQRIi or the inwardness of the spirit,
its self-inclusion; the formulation of thought, by means of
which the spirit proceeds out of itself, and itself becomes an
object, INTEL!IGEHJTIA (or MEKS) J finally, love (AMOR) . which
presents the closest unity of MEMORIA and IHT^LLIGEITT IA .
"
In positing the fact, however, that an image of the
Trinity existed in man's own nature, Augustine is careful to
point out that this image is an imperfect and inadequate one.
1. rlchaff, P. ITicene and Post-Kicene Fathers, Vol. Ill, On
the Trinity, XV, 21,
2. Dorner, J. A., & System of Christian ^oo trine
,
ir
ol. I, p. 392.
•
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tj> is simply looking through the glas~ darkly and gives vent
to his ovm profound sense of the inscrutability and incompre-
hensibility of the Supreme Being in any adequate sense. Here
is his typical attitude: llT I pray to our Lord God himself, of
whom we ought always to think, and yet of whom we are not able
to think worthily, and whom no speech is sufficient to declare,
that He will grant me "both help for understanding and explaining
that which I design, and pardon if^anything I offend." This
certainly is not the mood of an extreme rationalist trying to
explore and expound the Almighty to perfection.
But despite the inscrutability of G-od, Augustine holds
to the simplicity of G-od - not the simplicity of weakness "but
the simplicity of unity. Earnack observes, 3ltHe took over from
Plotinus the thought of the simplicity of God and attempted
actually to make use of it."
Augustine avers: ° "There is, accordingly, a gbod which
is alone simple, and therefore alone unchangeable, anl this is
G-od." In the same connection he writes, And this Trinity is
one G-od; and none the less simple because a Trinity." In fact,
simplicity and unity are essential to reality, according to
Augustine. ^"Thus, so far as anything acquires unity, so far
it exists. For uniformity and harmony are the effects of unity
and by these compound things exist so far as they have existence.
For Simple things exist by thamselves, for they are one."
1. Schaff , P. Mcene and Post-IIicenc Fathers , Vol, III, On
the Trinity, V, 1.
2. Harnack, A. History of D ogma
,
Vol. IV, footnote, p. 132.
3. Augustine, 1. The ;:orks of Autre lius Augustine , K$2Qod.s ,
Vol. I, lie City of Coo", Al, .LOT " ! '
4. loc. cit.
5. Schaff, P. op. cit., Vol. IV, On the Morals of the Ilani-
c ' aeans
, c. 6.
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Also, in fouiiaing his thought of Christ, Augustine
departs from the Greek inteilectualism of his day and attaches
unique significance to the humo.n element (homo) in Christ.
Harnack declares that, 1,T Augustine started from the human nature
(soul) in his construction of the God-man. 7 ' He certainly gives
a central place to Christ and ^mani^ests his deepest interest in
the human soul of Jesus.
In his study of Platonism Augustine failed to find the
humanity of Christ and makes mention of it as something lacking
in The Confessions . 3"Eut that T the Word was made flesh, and
dwelt among us T , I read not there."
Y
The Bishop of Hippo refuses to posit anthing less than
a copplete human nature in Christ, comparable- to his own. ^ 'or,
to prevent us from" seeking for one purgation for the part which
Porpl$ry calls intellectual, and another for the part he calls
spiritual, and another for the "body itself, our most mighty and
truthful Purifier and Savior assumed the whole human nature. ::
Christ is indeed the perfect man. ^"Since then they were written
truly, I acknowledge a perfect man jso lie in Christ; not the body
of a. man only, nor, with the "body, a sensitive soul without a
rational, hut very man, whom, not only as being, a form of
Truth, but for a certain great excellency of human nature and
a more perfect participation of wisdom, I judged to be preferred
before others." Christ then became for him the way to reality
1. Ilarnack, i. History of Dogma
,
Vol. V, p. 128.
2 . loc . eit
.
3
.
Augustine
,
k
.
The Confessions
, E ,33 .Pusey
,
VII, $
.
4. Aug- istine, A. The V/orks of Aurelius iugust ine ,~LI' Dods,
Vol. 1, City of God, T^~Z~2~. "
5. Augustine, A. The Confessions
.
JJ.B.Puseu, VII, 19.
ci
t
"because or his fundamental Icinship and genuine humanity. His
perfectjfcersonality made Him to be preferred above all others.
ttFcB? this is the Liediator between God and men, the man Christ
as
Jesus. For it is^man that He is the I.Iediator and the V/ajt." In
this respect, too. Augustine is friendly to the common person-
alistic position.
(«
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IV. SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING-,
In the foregoing we have endeavored to show that Aug-
ustine had within his writings nearly all of the essential ear-
marks of a personalistie ontology. These are not presented "by
him in any systematic way, .and frequently his insights are made,
without due regard to their implications and thus are sometimes
to "be found in a state of arrested development.
We have not tried to harmonize the contradictions,
apparent and otherwise, in Augustine, Our presentation is rather
a view of his personalistie thought giving some selected passages
and insights that reveal this emphasis.
We have confined our source work largely to The Con-
fessions , as our title would indicate, "but have not made this
limitation a strict one. We have also used other works, especially
his treatise, Qg the xrinity . Both of these worts named irere
written "by Augustine in the epoch of his maturity and therefore
may "be said to "be truly representative of his "best thought.
As to secondary sources, the most fruitful ones have
"been Harnack T s History of D ogma and Dean Khudson's The Philoso-
phy of I ersonalism .
We have appraoched the problem first of all "by study-
ing Augustine T s epistemology
,
measuring it "by the earmarks out-
lined in The Philosophy of Personal! sm . We have round Augustine
to "be somewhat at odds with personalism here, so much so that he
seems at times to fail to distinguish "between truth as a general
concept and truth as objectively real. The parallel that exists
"between these two
(I
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runs so close for Augustine, that at times they "become identical.
However, we do find in Augustine T s writings enough of earnest
inquiry into the theory of knowl&ge itself, that we are forced to
admit that he faced the practical problem of finding the paths
to reality.
The essential elements of personalism T s epistemology
are all to he found in Augustine; not with the same clarity and
harmony of course, as in modern philosophy, "but with the same
decided emphasis.
He has the insight of the dualism of thought and thing
and arrives at it through a psychological study of memory. He
sees the mind as something "other" than its thought, feelings
and activities. Of course this insight is undeveloped, hut the
germinal idea is there just the same.
The Kantian idea of the creative activity of thought
ismalao to he found in Augustine. Again we admit that he lacks
the emphasis and delineations of modern philosophy, hut he is
certainly far removed from the view that holds to the Mind T s
passivity. Augustine does not seem to ohserve that sensations
themselves are thought-products, hut he does suggest something
of their inarticulate state without the active mind. At least
he shows that the mind is capable of varied reproductions and
creations from material other than sense material.
There is also a certain workable validity and trustworth-
iness to he allowed to reason, according to Augustine^ Skepticism
has odious "bonds that are to he avoided. Faith is really a
c
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practical postulate for all .knowledge , "but is itself not capable
of logical rationalization.
The outstanding thing worthy of note about Augustine T s
epistemology
,
however, is that it contains the same decided am-
phasis as the personalis tic school, namely, upon the primacy of
the practical reason. Augustine suggests the cognitive functim
of will for knowledge and shows a remarkable clearness in his
insights regarding the validity of value judgments. These we
have pointed out especially in connection with Augustine's per-
sonal emancipation from materialistic modes of thought. The
powers of the intellect were looked upon by him now from a new
point of view, owing to the influence exerted on them by the
he art and wfll
•
When we come to Augustine's theory of being we find that
it is pcrsonalistic first of all in that it is essentially a
philosophy of metaphysics. To know God and the soul- the soul
and its God; this was his gift ajid task. Ultimate reality as
experienced by the finite and infinite personalities are both
subject and predicate for Augustine, all of the time.
In our restricted study of his metaphysics we find the
tell-tale marks of personalism, although not consistently without
contradictions and omissions. The nature of reality he presents
as concrete and individual, althoiigh frequently his conception of
the Absolute makes Him to embrace all finite existences. But
Augustine lays great stress upon self-certainty an^d avers that he
is surer 'Of his personal "elf than he is of the objective world

ah out him.
There is also a fundamental unity of the world and
wcr Id-ground in the person and ill of God, according to Augus-
tine. This agrees essentially with personalism 1 s affirmation that,
"*""A TDa.sal monism is necessary to meet the demands of reason."
This monism is not that of an unrelated Absolute hut rather of
One who alone has fulness of "being and is unconditioned.
Again, Augustine interprets reality in terms of volition
For personalism, '""reality is cause" , and this t; " causality must
"be interpreted in terms of volition. TT The kernel of our nature,
according to Augustine, lies in the will. The will of G-od also
is not separate from his reality. In fact, there are not realities
in the universe "but will. And it was this conviction, as
Eucken pats it, that separated Augustine further a.nd further
from the intellectualism of antiquity.
Regarding personalism 1 s position on the phenomenality
of matter, Augustine's thought is not so thorough or far-reaching.
However, he does distinguish clearly "between the reality of per-
sonalities ( ontclogieal) and that of the world of nature ah out
him (phenomenal). Also, Augustine has the concept of the ideality
of time and gives it c onsiderable study in his eleventh hook of
The Confessions
.
/It times he is not quite sure of his ohserva-
tions, but if his statements are allowed to he aarried to their
logical implications and conclusions, he too had abolished the
"two great phantoms of space and time". Personalism has con-
1. Khudson, 'A. D. The Philosophy of Personalism
,
v. ZOJr.
2. Ibid., p. 205.
3; Ibid.
, p. 178.
4. Eucken, R. The Problem of Human Life, p. 267.
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STstently hold that the idea of space and' tine were altogether
conceptual, and that this view is a striking corallary to the idea
of the phenonftrullity of matter.
.When considering the keystone in personalism 1 s meta-
physical arch, ,namely , that personality is the key to reality,
we fine lUgustine in marked agreement. In this respect at
least, Augsutine is far in advance of his day, and it is our
observation that the whole development of his philosophy is in
a pie-eminent degree an expression of personality and of the per-
sonal life. -*-' T The command to 'know thyself 1 "became for him the
way to God
.
,r Reality is thus to be investigated and discovered
only through personality.
In Augustine's view there is a vastness and a depth
to the totality of personal "being that is 1 rger than the intel-
lect. The Hairs of man's head are easier to be numbered than
are his feelings and aspirations. But withal* there is a self-
certainty about the. personal life that is affirmed, which provides
for the only adequate answer to the questions of a.bstract thought
regarding identity, ch<ange , one and many. The key to the ultimate/*?
/
real is to be found first and last for Augustine in man T s own person-
al life. Within himself alone will he find the ladders that are
long enough and strong eno Lgh to reach to abiding reality.
• In building his thought of G-od, Augustine traces his
struggle from Maniehaeism (with its ethical dualism) to a scrip-
tural view of the infinite personality. Ke shows how he learned
1. Harnack, A, History of Dogma, Vol. V, p. 107.
1<
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f£«H N^o-platonism that C-od was spiritual rather than spatial.
However, in constructing his definite ideas about this Spirit-
ual Being, he .falls bade on the Scriptures for his starting
point. He finds there that man was made in the image of God ;
and from this he concludes that if man is like God then God must
be like man. Han is not only from God, he is of God. This leads
to the thought that God is a person. Once more we may say that
Augustine was personalistic in his habits of thought.
Also, God is the Supreme Good, for Augustine, The idea
of value or T,7orth is pre-eminent here. God is better than the
best tha"$: he can think of. However, Augustine is also careful to
warn that God is more than he can think of, and advises that at
most the Augustinian pictures of God are but seen as through a
glass darkly.
Even in his view of the Trinity' Yugustine approaches
the problem from the psychological point of view rather than the
social. His emphasis is upon unit:; ojt consciousness rather than
upon three distinct centers of consciousness. Once more he is in
agreement with personalism. Innfaet, he tries to understand the
Trinity through his own mental constitution and uses the latter
as an analogue in that regard.
Augustine also maintains, despite his theological ad-
ventures, the simplicity of God - not the simplicity of shallow-
ness, to be sure, but the simplicity of unity.
A nd finally, in considering the nature of Christ,
Augustine attaches unique signifieance to the hU^an element in
» t
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his Master, He was the perfect man, and as such, was the Med-
iator and the Way.
Thus in Augustine 1 s metaphysics, as we have endeavored
to show in the foregoing, the ontologically real is to "be found
only in personality. This marlcs the emphatic footprint in
Augustine T s thought, and to a large degree the modern pwrson-
alistic philosophy has had to retrace the same steps (whether
wittingly or not) to reach its present position.
(i
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